People taking decisions in complex environments dominated by multiple options and constraints are susceptible on applying mental shortcuts, such as heuristics, as there is human cognitive limitation on arriving to an optimal choice by weighting in all the given factors. In other words, people will simplify the problem by applying mental shortcuts to arrive not necessarily to an optimal decision but to a satisficing one.
This view is in contradiction with traditional economic utility theory that argues that people can take an optimal decision that maximizes the expected utility, a probability-weighted average of utility over all possible outcomes of a decision. This approach could mean that the utility theory would be sufficient predictor of human decision.
However, (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) developed “prospect theory” that asserts that, in the face of uncertainty, we group risks and then build value functions to assess them. These functions are not linear, in part, because of loss aversion; they are steeper for losses than for gains because people are more concerned about losing what they already have than gaining what they do not yet have.
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) also talk about System 1 and System 2 (Fig below) as two distinct modes of decision making that aligns with non-compensatory decision making (System 1) and compensatory decision making (System 2) :